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Many valid interests can be served through the use of summary
procedures such as the creditor's interest in obtaining quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction."9 However, such public interest must be found to outweigh
the private interest subjected to the procedure in order for the
requirements of due process to be satisfied."0
The interest of an innkeeper in having a lien upon his guest's property
should be balanced, as in Klim, against the private interest of the guest in
the use and possession of his property.8 ' Limiting the interpretation of
Sniadach to wages and prejudgment garnishment is unduly restrictive of
the actual position which the Supreme Court has taken. The unrestricted
use of personal property may be of equal or greater value to its owner than
the right to possession of rented premises,8 2 welfare benefits8 3 and wages. 4
If deprivation of only a portion of an employee's wages through
garnishment proceedings may "drive a wage earning family to the wall,',
the conclusion seems inescapable that deprivation of all of one's personal
property, resulting perhaps in a corollary inability to gain employment,"
would very likely have the same result.
All liens, or innkeepers' liens, are not per se unconstitutional
procedures as the court in Klim points out.8 7 However, it seems that Klim
properly concluded that this particular lien statute is unconstitutional,
because it does not exempt from the operation of the lien such property as
is essential for the health, safety and well-being of the owner prior to a
satisfactory hearing.
MARK M. HEATWOLE
PRIOR CONVICTIONS AS IMPEACHING EVIDENCE
When a criminal defendant testifies in his own behalf he does so as an
ordinary witness,' and evidence of prior convictions may be used to
7See generally Kennedy, Due Process Limitations on Creditor's Remedies: Some
Reflections on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 19 AM. U. L. REv. 158, 160-63 (1970).
MSee note 34 supra.
81315 F. Supp. at 120-22.
82Mihans v. Municipal Court, 7 Cal. App. 3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1970).
83Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970); Goliday v. Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. II. 1969); Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.
Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
t4Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
851d. at 341-42.
SThis was one facet of the plaintiff's claim in Klim, 315 F. Supp. at 112.
'7Id. at 124.
13A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 890-91 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1970).
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impeach the credibility of his testimony. 2 The record of prior convictions
as impeaching evidence is considered indicative of the defendant's
criminal nature which allegedly signifies a propensity to falsify his
testimony.3 The courts are in agreement that the practice of using prior
convictions to impeach a defendant's credibility is necessary for proper
evaluation of his testimony.' However, the extent to which proceedings
must have progressed before an accused is deemed to have been
"convicted" for purposes of impeachment in a subsequent proceeding has
been the subject of conflicting views among the courts.
In the recent decision of State v. Frey,- the Supreme Court of Missouri
considered whether the record of a prior judicial proceeding, at which the
defendant was found guilty but no sentence imposed, was admissible as a
"'conviction" for purposes of impeachment. The defendant Frey was
convicted in a state circuit court for unlawful sale of hallucinogenic and
narcotic drugs. At the trial, Frey's testimony' was impeached by evidence
of a prior proceeding in which he had pleaded guilty to another narcotics
violation, but in which imposition of a sentence had been suspended7 and
probation imposed. The supreme court, in reversing, ruled that
impeachment of Frey's credibility by introducing evidence of the prior
conviction was permissible,8 but that impeaching convictions must be the
products of final judgment. "[U]nless sentence is imposed or pronounced
in the prior proceeding," the requisite finality is absent 9 and the
proceeding may not be used to impeach the credibility of the defendant
under the applicable Missouri statute. i0
21d.
'Notes 60-62 and accompanying text infra.
4See, e.g., State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 408 P.2d 400, 405 (1965); State v. Cote, 108
N.H. 290, 235 A.2d 111, 114-16 (1967).
'459 S.W.2d 359 (Mo. 1970).
'The defendant was asked if he had previously been convicted on a narcotics charge. His
reply was that he had not. 459 S.W.2d at 359-60.
'The supreme court was careful to note that this was not a suspended sentence, but a
situation in which no sentence was imposed at all prior to the time the defendant was placed
on probation for a period of two years. 459 S.W.2d at 360.
id. at 362.
VId. The court relied upon State v. Townley, 147 Mo. 205, 48 S.W. 833 (1898), which
held that conviction includes final judgment, and when sentence is not imposed a person is
not convicted.
tr"he applicable Missouri statute is as follows:
Any person who has been convicted of a criminal offense is,
notwithstanding, a competent witness; but the conviction may be proved to
affect his credibility, either by the record or by his own cross-examination,
upon which he must answer any question relevant to that inquiry, and the
party cross-examining shall not be concluded by his answer.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.050 (1952).
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The practice of impeaching the credibility of a witness with evidence of
prior convictions has evolved from the common law theory that a person
convicted of an infamous crime" was incompetent as a witness.' 2 This
strict doctrine of incompetency was based on the theory that one convicted
of this type of crime was a person of such dubious character that he was
unworthy of belief. 3 Although this theory has not existed in Anglo-
American law since the late 19th century, 4 the principle of presumed
untrustworthiness associated with prior convictions has survived.
With impeachment by prior convictions a common practice in
American courts, 15 it is important, before allowing the introduction of
evidence of a prior conviction, to determine exactly what constitutes a
proper conviction for purposes of impeachment. Generally, two views of
the meaning of conviction emerge from the cases, one popular and one
technical. 6 The popular view denotes the determination of the fact of
guilt, as by plea or verdict, while the technical view is associated with
official completeness of proceedings, denoting final judgment.'" In
construing the legislative intent of statutes permitting the use of prior
convictions for impeachment, there has been disagreement among the
courts as to whether the popular"8 or the technical 9 meaning of conviction
is the proper standard for assessing impeaching evidence.2
"Infamous crimes included treason, felonies, and acts of falsehood. 1 S. GREENLEAF,
EVIDENCE § 373 (16th ed. 1892).
123 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 752 (12th ed. 1955); 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§ 519 at 570 (3ded. 1940).
11 S. GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 372 (16th ed. 1892).
" n England the convicted criminal's competency as a witness was first assured by the
Criminal Evidence Act of 1898, 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36.
'sSee 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 987 (3d ed. 1970). (List of statutes prescribing the
use of prior convictions for impeachment).
1The two possible interpretations of conviction have been noted by many courts. See,
e.g., People v. Banks, 53 Cal. 370, 348 P.2d 102, 116, 1 Cal. Rptr. 669 (1959); Truchon v.
Toomey, 116 Cal. App. 2d 736, 254 P.2d 638 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953); Ex parte White, 28
Okla. Crim. 180, 230 P. 522 (1924); Commonwealth ex reL McClenachan v. Reading, 336
Pa. 165, 6 A.2d 776 (1939).
"7See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 365 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1963); Dial v.
Commonwealth, 142 Ky. 32, 133 S.W. 976 (1911); People v. Fabian, 192 N.Y. 443,85 N.E.
672 (1908); Commonwealth v. Palarino, 168 Pa. Super. 152, 77 A.2d 665 (1951).
"8See, e.g., State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 408 P.2d 400 (1965); People v. Ward, 134 Cal.
301, 66 P. 372 (1901); Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 365 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1963).
"E.g., City of Boston v. Santosuosso, 307 Mass. 302, 30 N.E.2d 278, 296 (1940);
Commonwealth v. Finkelstein, 191 Pa. Super. 328, 156 A.2d 888, 892 (1959).
'Prior convictions also are used for various limiting or disqualifying purposes other
than that of impeachment in subsequent proceedings. The majority of courts demand finality
of proceedings before employing convictions for such purposes. See, e.g., Medical Bd. v.
Rodgers, 190 Ark. 266, 79 S.W.2d 83 (1935) (Probation without sentencing not sufficient
conviction as grounds for revocation of doctor's license); Prewitt v. Wilson, 242 Ky. 231, 46
S.W.2d 90 (1932) (Sentencing required before conviction used to disenfranchise); Scott v.
CASE COMMENTS
Entering a criminal proceeding, a defendant is presumed innocent; but
upon a plea or verdict of guilty the courts which apply the popular
meaning of conviction consider the defendant's guilt firmly established. In
these courts, ascertainment of guilt is equated with conviction and such
conviction is deemed acceptable for impeachment purposes.2t This view
was adopted by the Kentucky Court of Appeals in Commonwealth v.
Reynolds,u where the defendant, charged with maliciously cutting and
stabbing another with intent to kill, was impeached with a record of
conviction for uttering forged checks. That record contained a plea of
guilty with sentence postponed and probation imposed. Similarly, in State
v. Reyes,21 the Arizona Supreme Court relied on the record of a guilty
verdict alone to impeach, although judgment and sentence had not been
imposed at the prior proceeding. Both courts noted that the purpose of
impeachment 4 did not demand finality of sentencing. Rather, as the court
observed in the Reynolds case,
[tihe Rule [of impeachment of a witness] is not concerned with the
penalty which may or may not have been imposed or whether, if
one was imposed, the accused served out his time in the
penitentiary. If it is shown that he has been guilty of a felony and
his guilt has been fixed either by a plea of guilty or a verdict of the
jury, he has been convicted so far as this Rule is concerned ....
If the presumption of innocence has been overcome, the extent of
the penalty is of little importance and he has been convicted of a
felony under this particular Rule.21
American Express Co., 233 S.W. 492 (Mo. Ct. App. 1921) (Final judgment of conviction of
suspect necessary before reward given for his capture); People v. Fabian, 192 N.Y. 443, 85
N.E. 672 (1908) (Finality of proceedings required before conviction used to disenfranchise);
Smith v. Commonwealth, 134 Va. 589, 113 S.E. 707 (1922) (Sentencing required for
conviction before that conviction is proper grounds for removal from public office). Contra,
O'Hara v. Montgomery, 275 Mich. 504, 267 N.W. 550 (1936) (Finding of guilt sufficient as
grounds for removal from office). See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55-57 (1968)
(Recognizing the importance of convictions because of their use in subsequent proceedings).
21State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 408 P.2d 400 (1965); Holcomb v. State, 218 Ark. 608,
238 S.W.2d 505 (1951); People v. Tiner, I1 Cal. App. 3d 428, 89 Cal. Rptr. 834 (Ct. App.
1970); People v. Ward, 134 Cal. 301, 66 P. 372 (1901); People v. Andrae, 295 111. 445, 129
N.E. 178 (1920); Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 365 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1963); State v.
Knowles, 98 Me. 429, 57 A. 588 (1904); State v. Shaw, 73 Vt. 149,50 A. 863 (1901); State v.
Robbins, 37 Wash. 2d 492, 224 P.2d 1076 (1950).
-365 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1963).
"99 Ariz. 257,408 P.2d 400 (1965).
2 The purpose of impeachment was stated to be that of a warning to the court and the
jury that the testimony of the witness may not be trustworthy because he is a criminal. 408
P.2d at 405, citing Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 365 S.W.2d 853, 859 (Ky. 1963).
25365 S.W.2d at 856 (emphasis added).
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To courts which apply this interpretation of conviction,2' the alleged
probative value of informing the jury of a person's questionable integrity
is the deciding factor in a court's decision to consider as proper evidence a
plea or verdict of guilty. There is no reason to withhold from the jury the
defendant's history, which marks him as a witness of dubious integrity,"7
once there has been a prior judicial determination that the defendant is
guilty of a criminal act. Nothing more is needed to fulfill the requirement
and historical rationale of impeachment evidence than the fact of guilt. It
is this fact of criminal misconduct, and not the subsequent sentencing,
which is said to establish the untrustworthiness of the defendant whenever
he takes the witness stand. 28
In some jurisdictions. the courts are concerned more with the effect
that the introduction of a prior conviction has on the rights and status of
the defendant than with the alleged probative value as possible impeaching
evidence.2 9 These courts adhere to the technical interpretation of
conviction, which denotes finality of the proceeding. This position is
demonstrated by the holding of the New York Court of Appeals in People
v. Fabian.Y In this case the defendant was charged with voting while
knowing he was disqualified by his criminal record. The alleged
disqualification was based on a "conviction" for burglary consisting of a
guilty verdict upon which sentence was not passed. The court noted that
the popular interpretation of conviction was appropriate when
distinguishing one stage in a criminal proceeding from another.3 ' But
when the conviction is used to affect the status or rights of the defendant in
a subsequent proceeding, a party is not deemed convicted unless final
judgment has been passed on the verdict or plea and sentence imposed.
2
The courts which adhere to this interpretation of conviction often do
so upon the belief that final judgment will best protect the defendant from
possible prejudice3 due to the use of incomplete and unreliable records of
prior proceedingsYu In these courts there is an expressed aversion to the
use as impeaching evidence of guilty pleas or verdicts without sentencing.35
"Note 21 supra.
EState v. Duke, 100 N.H. 292, 123 A.2d 745, 746 (1958); accord, State v. Cote, 108
N.H. 290, 235 A.2d 111 (1967).
"'Notes 60-62 and accompanying text infra.
"Notes 55-59 and accompanying text infra.
-192 N.Y. 443, 85 N.E. 672 (1908).
3'85 N.E. at 675.
=Id.
3Notes 65-70 and accompanying text infra.
NAmerican Bank v. Felder, 59 Pa. Super. 166, 170-71 (1915); cf Commonwealth v.
Finkelstein, 191 Pa. Super. 328, 156 A.2d 888, 892 (1959).
-See Karasek v. Bockus, 293 Mass. 371, 199 N.E. 726 (1936); Attorney General v.
Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264, 134 N.E. 407, 420 (1922); Neibling v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 177
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Absent the finality of sentencing, a verdict may be set aside on a motion
for a new trial, new evidence may be introduced, and in subsequent
proceedings the defendant may actually be found not guilty.36 Until final
judgment the verdict may go for naught and "injure the witness in the
estimate of the jury, just as in a less degree the mere indictment of the
witness would.
' 37
While the Frey court held that a proceeding in which the imposition of
sentence was suspended did not constitute a proper conviction for
impeachment purposes, other courts have found probation before
sentencing of sufficient finality to constitute a conviction. Such holdings
appear to fall somewhere between the popular and technical
interpretations of conviction. There is a requirement of more than a bare
finding of guilt but less than imposition of sentence. The holding in the
Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Palarino38 reflects this position.
In Palarino the defendant had been impeached by a record of a guilty
verdict, suspension of imposition of sentence, and probation. The court
stated the requirement that there must be prior conviction before a record
is admissible as impeaching evidence 39 and that the probation was not
sentencing." While it was contended by the defendant that there could be
no conviction without sentencing, the court held that since the probation
order was a proper substitution for sentencing, the proceeding constituted
a conviction for purposes of impeachment."
In reaching its conclusion, the Palarino court considered probation the
product of conclusive adjudication of the defendant's guilt, and that
nothing more was required for impeaching evidence. 42 The court's
interpretation is consistent with that expressed by the United States
Supreme Court in Korematsu v. United States,"3 which found the record
S.W.2d 502, 504 (1944); Commonwealth v. Finkelstein, 191 Pa. Super. 328, 156 A.2d 888,
892 (1959).
3'Commonwealth v. Kiley, 150 Mass. 325, 23 N.E. 55 (1890).
7American Bank v. Felder, 59 Pa. Super. 166, 170 (1915). The value of a record of
indictment after arrest was considered slight for purposes of impeachment in Slater v. United
States, I Okla. Crim. 275, 98 P. 110 (1908), where it was held arrest or indictment may be
associated with innocent parties and may be no more than mere hearsay. In People v.
Eddington, 23 Mich. App. 210, 178 N.W.2d 686 (1970) and People v. Brocato, 17 Mich.
App. 277, 169 N.W.2d 483 (1969), the courts noted the overwhelming possibility of prejudice
in the use of records of arrest and indictment as weighed against their probative value.
u168 Pa. Super. 152,77 A.2d 665 (1951); accord, Pedorella v. Hoffman, 165 A.2d 721
(R.I. 1960).
1177 A.2d at 667.
Old. The court considered probation as judgment.
"Id. Probation was considered as much a form of judicial control as imposition of
sentence.
421d.
-319 U.S. 432 (1943).
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of suspended imposition of sentence a sufficient judgment to permit
appellate review." Although the Korematsu Court stated that the
requirement of sentencing is necessary to constitute an appealable
judgment, it further held that sentencing was necessary only where there is
no other judicial determination or control imposed on the defendant.' 5
Probation was deemed sufficient judicial control over the defendant since
it took the form of a mild ambulatory punishment."6 There would be no
such disciplinary measures imposed if the guilt of the defendant had not
been judicially determined, for probation is only imposed on a convicted
person. 7
However, neither sentencing nor other forms of judicial control
imposed by the trial court are always determinative of finality of
conviction. The question of the admissibility as impeaching evidence of a
prior conviction pending appeal is an example of this situation. The
majority of federal' and state 9 jurisdictions allow the use of records of
prior proceedings where the outcome of that proceeding is under appeal.
These courts reason that until a conviction is set aside, it is a verity and
proper proof of criminal misconduct indicating the witness' questionable
veracity.50 However, problems do exist when this majority practice is
followed. If an appellate court reverses, a conviction becomes a nullity
"The defendant was found guilty by a federal district court in California of violating
restrictions imposed on Japanese-Americans during World War II. The defendant was
placed on five years probation and he appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit. The circuit court, doubting whether it had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from
a probation order, asked the United States Supreme Court to resolve the question.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215-16 (1944).
'319 U.S. at 434. The court followed the holdings of Hill v. Wampler, 298 U.S. 460,
464 (1936), and Miller v. Aderhold, 288 U.S. 206, 210 (1933). Both cases stated that there
could be no final judgment in a criminal case until actual sentence had been imposed.
"1319 U.S. at 435,following Cooper v. United States, 91 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 1937).
11319 U.S. at 435,following Nix v. United States, 131 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1942). The Nix
court held that even where imposition of sentence is suspended there is judgment of
conviction because probation can only be "visited" on one convicted and probation is a
form of "punishment." 131 F.2d at 858.
"Newman v. United States, 331 F.2d 968 (8th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 975
(1965); Bloch v. United States, 226 F.2d 185 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 948
(1956); United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
959 (1949). Contra, Campbell v. United States, 176 F.2d 45 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
"Latikos v. State, 17 Ala. App. 655, 88 So. 47 (1921); State v. Johnson, 99 Ariz. 52,406
P.2d 403 (1965); State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 408 P.2d 400 (1965); People v. Braun, 14 Cal.
2d 1, 92 P.2d 402 (1939); Gonzalez v. State, 97 So. 2d 127 (Fla. App. 1957); Dickson v.
Yates, 194 Iowa 910, 188 N.W. 948 (1922); Shaffer v. State, 124 Neb. 7, 244 N.W. 921
(1932); In re Abrams, 36 Ohio App. 384, 173 N.E. 312 (1930); McGee v. State, 206 Tenn.
230, 332 S.W.2d 507 (1960); State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 206 P. 717 (1922); State v.
Martin, 176 Wash. 637,30 P.2d 660 (1934). Contra, Adkins v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.2d
165 (Ky. 1958); McCauley v. Stone, 315 S.W.2d 476 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958).
5 State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 408 P.2d 400 (1965).
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and cannot be used for impeachment.51 Accordingly, while an appeal is
pending or undecided it cannot be determined with certainty whether the
conviction will be sustained or reversed. Therefore, it would appear
premature to use such a conviction since it may later be reversed and
declared a nullity.
52
The minority of courts which prohibit convictions under appeal from
being used as impeaching evidence follow the principles enunciated in
Foure v. Commonwealth.5 The Kentucky court considered an appeal as a
suspension of the original proceeding, which does not become final until
termination of that appeal.54 In essence, the trial is not concluded nor is
guilt established while the case is under appeal. Rather, the trial is viewed
as being "continued" until the appellate court makes its ruling., By
demanding finality of appellate review before a conviction could be used
for impeachment purposes, the evidence of guilt would be definitely
established and there would be no possibility of exposing to the jury a
conviction which may later be reversed.
In arriving at its holding in the principal case, the Frey court possibly
considered the rehabilitative valve of probation as more important than
the probative value of impeachment with prior convictions. The refusal to
employ the record of probation suggests that the court looked not to the
fact of prior guilt of the defendant but rather to the possibility that
rehabilitation of the defendant could best be accomplished without
exposing his record of crime. Probation allows the defendant, through
compliance with the terms of that probation, the opportunity to
permanently avoid punishment and the stigma of being considered a
convict. To look only to the determination of guilt and not to the fact that
the defendant is capable of rehabilitation would defeat the purpose of
probation.- The practice of stigmatizing the witness despite his probation
51Adkins v. Commonwealth, 309 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1958); Foure v. Commonwealth, 214
Ky. 620, 283 S.W. 958 (1926); State v. Blevins, 425 S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1968); see People v.
Van Zile, 80 Misc. 329, 141 N.Y.S. 168 (Sup. Ct. 1913); Ringer v. State, 129 S.W.2d 654
(Tex. 1939). Contra, Latikos v. State, 17 Ala. App. 655, 88 So. 47 (1921); People v. Braun,
14 Cal. 2d 1, 92 P.2d 409 (1939); State v. Crawford, 60 Utah 6, 206 P. 717 (1922).
52When a prior conviction which is later reversed and theoretically struck from a
defendant's record remains a factor in the conviction of a defendant witness where he is
impeached by that prior conviction, the erroneous conviction is in fact not completely
abrogated. Foure v. Commonwealth, 214 Ky. 620, 283 S.W. 958, 962 (1926); State v.
Blevins, 425 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Mo. 1968).
0214 Ky. 620, 283 S.W. 958 (1926).
"283 S.W. at 962.
"State v. Blevins, 425 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Mo. 1968).
5The purpose of probation was well stated in the following language from the case of
Delaney v. State, 190 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1966):
The obvious purpose [of probation] was to provide for the
rehabilitation of one who had committed a crime without formally and
1971]
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might remove the incentive to complete his rehabilitation program. s7
In considering suspended imposition of sentence as something less
than final judgment, the Frey court reasoned that the defendant's guilt
could not be conclusively established by such a record.n The court relied
on an earlier New York case holding that suspended sentence before
imprisonment was not final judgment," and reasoned that where no
sentence was imposed there was no final judgment which could be used for
impeachment purposes. Apparently underlying this decision was the belief
that when there is a possibility that a record will work to the detriment of
the defendant in future proceedings, probation is not final judgment."
By following the technical interpretation of conviction and requiring
that there be sentencing before an accused is convicted for impeachment
purposes, the Frey court apparently did not consider the policy upon
which impeachment by prior conviction is founded: That a person's
veracity can be determined by examining his previous conduct. In
appraising the theory underlying impeachment by prior conviction,
Justice Holmes once stated that
• . . when it is proved that a witness has been convicted of a crime,
the only ground for disbelieving him which such proof affords is
the general readiness to do evil which the conviction may be
supposed to show. It is from that general disposition alone that the
jury is asked to infer a readiness to lie in the particular case, and
thence that he has lied in fact. The evidence has no tendency to
prove that he was mistaken, but only that he has perjured himself,
and it reaches that conclusion solely through the general
proposition that he is of bad character and unworthy of credit."
judicially branding the individual as a convicted criminal with consequent
loss of civil rights and other damning consequences.
Id. at 580. See Arketa v. Wilson, 373 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1967); Exparte Medley, 73 Idaho
274, 253 P.2d 794 (1953).
"The court in Exparte Medley, 73 Idaho 274, 253 P.2d 794 (1953) spoke of probation
[as creating] and rightfully so, a hope in the heart of the accused that he
may ultimately be released under an order of probation without the stigma
of a judgment of conviction. This is an incentive for complete
rehabilitation and reform ...
Id. at 797.
u459 S.W.2d at 362; accord, Attorney General v. Pelletier, 240 Mass. 264,310,311, 134
N.E. 407, 420 (1922).
"People v. Page, 125 Misc. 538, 31 N.Y.S. 401 (1925).
"rhis concern for a person's future rights was evidenced in the holding of People v.
Fabian, 192 N.Y. 443, 85 N.E. 672 (1908) wherein it was stated:
• . . where sentence is suspended, and so the direct consequences of fine
and imprisonment are suspended or postponed temporarily or indefinitely,
so, also, the indirect consequences are likewise postponed.
Id. at 674.
"Gertz v. Fitchburg R.R., 137 Mass. 77, 78 (1884).
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As noted by Justice Holmes, this assumed untrustworthiness is not
predicated upon a party's specific history of falsification, but rather upon
his presumed general bad character and contempt for the law. Proof that a
person is willing to commit criminal acts tends to show a disregard for
acceptable behavior in society, which is translated into a willingness to
give false testimony.' 2 Thus once a party's guilt has been judicially
determined, his testimony may be regarded with suspicion whenever he
takes the witness stand.
The requirement of sentencing in Frey does not correspond with the
principle that it is the criminal misconduct itself and not the punishment
which demonstrates a party's trustworthiness or lack thereof. There was
little doubt as to Frey's guilt in the prior proceeding, as he pleaded guilty
to the narcotics violation. Yet the Supreme Court would not permit a
guilty plea to be used as evidence to warn the jury of possible testimonial
unreliability. If the court had followed the popular interpretation of
conviction, this ascertainment of guilt may have indicated the defendant's
propensity to lie under oath.' 3 Instead the court, reluctant to allow
incomplete proceedings as impeaching evidence, protected the defendant
from impeachment by possibly unreliable evidence, by implicitly
questioning the rationale of the popular view.Y
However, the Frey decision is compatible with the opinion expressed
by several writers that the practice of impeachment by record of prior
convictions is of questionable value because of the inevitable prejudice it
creates in the minds of the jury." When prior convictions are introduced
'2See Ladd, Credibility Test-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 166, 176 (1940). See
also PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RuLEs OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES rule 6-09 comment (1969).
"Notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
"Notes 33-37 and accompanying text supra.
'sSee Ladd, Credibility Tests-Current Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1940);
McGowan, Impeachment of Criminal Defendants By Prior Convictions. I ARIZ. ST. U. L.
J. 1 (1970); Note, Constitutional Problems Inherent In The Admissibility Of Prior Record
Conviction Evidence For The Purpose Of Impeaching The Credibility Of The Defendant
Witness, 37 U. CIN. L. Rav. 168 (1968).
"E.g., Brown v. United States, 370 F.2d 242, 244 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Classic illustration
of prejudicial affect of impeachment far outweighing probative value of showing prior
conviction). In United States v. Beno, 324 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1963) it was held that basic to
the concept of fair trial is the contention that a defendant is entitled to be judged on the
specific offense charged rather than on a history of his past convictions which may mark his
conduct as "reprehensible." Courts continue to allow the use of prior convictions for
impeachment in the face of prejudice of impartiality on the reasoning that such prejudice can
be controlled by limiting instructions. This is predicated on the belief exhibited in Delli Paoli
v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957) that jury instructions are successful in accomplishing
this purpose; but in actuality, as pointed out in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440
(1959), their effectiveness in this respect has been less than satisfactory. See generally Note,
The Limiting Instruction-Its Effectiveness and Effect, 51 MINN. L. REV. 264 (1966).
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to the jury, it may properly use them to judge the witness' credibility. The
jury may also improperly apply the impeaching evidence and either use the
conviction as conclusively showing the defendant's general criminal
tendencies or conclude that since the defendant has been guilty of a
previous crime he is probably guilty of the crime with which he is presently
charged. While the purpose of exposing the defendant's history of
conviction is limited only to impeachment of the credibility of his
testimony, 7 the jury is often unable to completely divorce this evidence
from the material issues which it must consider." This danger of jury
prejudice was noted in Richards v. United States,9 which stated that
impeachment may properly display questionable credibility, but there also
may exist "such an atmosphere of aspersion and disrepute about the
defendant as to convince the jury that he is an habitual law breaker who
should be punished and confined for the general good of the
community.
'70
Even with the concern expressed over the use of prior conviction as
impeaching evidence, 71 this well-established practice has, and will likely
continue to be used to evaluate the credibility of a defendant's testimony.
This is evidenced by the provisions allowing impeachment by prior
convictions in the PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES. 72 In light of the continued
use of impeachment by prior conviction it will become incumbent upon
the courts to balance the probative value of impeachment by prior
convictions against the ever-present threat of jury prejudice. The courts
will have to demand that the evidence of convictions introduced for
impeachment will not unduly prejudice a defendant. Some courts recently
have moved in this direction by allowing broad judicial discretion to
"Commonwealth v. Finkelstein, 191 Pa. Super. 358, 156 A.2d 888, 892 (1959); 2 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 488 at 590 (3d ed. 1940).
9"Any testimony given by the defendant after impeachment by prior conviction is
regarded with the greatest suspicion by the jury, and the defendant is marked with the stigma
of prior conviction which weighs heavily upon the supposedly impartial determination of the
jury. In one survey, results showed that juries granted acquittals far less often to defendants
with prior convictions than to defendants without criminal convictions. The defendants were
divided into two groups. One group consisted of defendants who had no previous criminal
record or were able to keep that fact from the jury. The second group was made up of
defendants who had previous criminal records and the jury knew of those records. In similar
prosecution cases the first group of defendants received acquittals in 65%of the cases
reported. The second group of defendants received acquittals in only 38%. H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
'1192 F.2d 602 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
7 'Id. at 605.
7'Note 73 infra.
"PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES rule 6-09 (1969).
